sábado, 24 de setembro de 2011


entagon rethinks bioterror effort

Critics say US$1.5-billion initiative has not delivered results.
Soldiers are yet to see any effective new countermeasures against bioterror agents.Soldiers are yet to see any effective new countermeasures against bioterror agents.K. KULISH/CORBIS
In the film Contagion, it takes just a few months for scientists to make a vaccine against a deadly virus. Yet a real US military programme that aimed to do just that is being dismantled after five years of trying.
The Transformational Medical Technologies (TMT) initiative, born in the US Department of Defense in 2006, was originally conceived as a five-year, US$1.5-billion project that would substantially accelerate the development of countermeasures to protect soldiers against biological attacks. Made into a permanent programme in 2009, it set out to sequence the genomes of potential bioterror agents, explore new drug technologies and develop 'broad-spectrum' therapies that would work against multiple bacterial and viral pathogens — especially haemorrhagic fever viruses such as Ebola and Marburg. Supporters of the programme point out that three candidate drugs developed under the programme, for pathogens including Ebola virus, are now in clinical trials.
The TMT programme, however, has ceased to exist as a stand-alone effort. Alan Rudolph, director of Chemical and Biological Technologies for the TMT's parent office, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is folding some TMT projects into other Pentagon efforts and reordering their priorities. Critics say that it has failed in its underlying objective to provide a faster, game-changing approach to biodefence. No antibiotics developed by the TMT have entered clinical trials. The drug candidates it has developed are designed for single pathogens, not multiple threats. And although the programme is set to award a major clinical-trial contract later this year, the drug being tested would treat not exotic, untreatable pathogens but ordinary influenza, a disease already heavily researched outside the Pentagon.
Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota's Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy thinks that the programme was overambitious and ill-conceived. "They're wasting tonnes of money," he says.
The programme's architects have vigorously defended its record. "There is a success there that we need to build on," says Jean Reed, who, as deputy assistant to the secretary of defence for chemical and biological defence and chemical demilitarization, laid the plans for the TMT. Now a consultant to the National Defense University in Washington DC, Reed adds that the programme has become the archetype within the defence department for the "development of treatments for biologically engineered and naturally occurring disease threats".
"The TMT from its inception was a high-risk, high-payoff or high-failure effort," says David Hough, who became TMT programme manager in January 2007. He says that the effort has paid off: "If we get an engineered threat or something that we haven't seen before that is causing a lot of deaths, we think we can respond to that." He says that the programme's track record is better than that of the Pentagon's traditional chemical and biological defence research effort over the past decade.
Although the TMT aimed to transform biodefence, it encountered many of the roadblocks that have hindered the nation's biodefence effort as a whole, which has spent $60 billion since 2001 with only modest returns (see Nature 477, 150–152; 2011). Developing broad-spectrum drugs for the battlefield has proved difficult because regulators are more accustomed to evaluating drugs that target one specific disease, and drug companies prefer to focus on diseases that affect many people rather than on obscure pathogens that could serve as bioweapons.
These considerations helped to lead the TMT into focusing on influenza in 2009. That year, US government officials were faced with the double threat of H1N1 swine flu, which threatened to explode into a devastating pandemic, and the more deadly H5N1 bird flu virus, which was continuing to infect small numbers of people.
Government officials were "practically paralysed by the fear that they were dealing with two strains at a time; they didn't know what they were going to do", says Darrell Galloway, Rudolph's predecessor at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, who was a driving force for the TMT from its inception until he retired in January 2010. Galloway saw influenza as an opening to prove the programme's worth. In May 2009, he awarded a contract to AVI BioPharma of Bothell, Washington, to make a flu drug against the H1N1 virus, using its genetic sequence as a basis. Within months, the company had made a drug and tested it in ferrets.
Yet the move angered some within the Pentagon and perplexed observers, because influenza is the focus of considerable research funded by the US Department of Health and Human Services. "I'm having a really hard time making a connection between the investments we're making and the benefit to soldiers," said one staff member at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
The TMT also stumbled because companies attracted to biodefence tend to be small and inexperienced. Larger, established companies prefer to pursue more profitable markets, fearing that the federal government will commit to stockpiling only limited amounts of drugs developed for defence purposes.
The company behind all three TMT drugs now in clinical trials, AVI BioPharma, has never had a drug approved by the US Food and Drug Administration. The company's technology uses antisense, in which short pieces of genetic material bind to a pathogen's genes and block their production. The technology has led to few approved drugs owing to safety problems and a lack of efficacy. Still, the TMT and the Army awarded the company a $291-million, six-year contract last year to fund two clinical trials, for its drugs against Ebola and Marburg viruses. Now AVI BioPharma has set its sights on a contract for clinical trials of its antisense drug for H1N1.
AVI BioPharma's chief executive, Chris Garabedian, says that the company's technology is safer than that tested by other drug firms, and thus can be used in higher doses that are more likely to be effective than other antisense drugs that have failed in the past.
But critics say that it was a mistake for the TMT to invest so much in a technology that does not have a proven track record in infectious disease. "Everybody in that field thinks antisense is a failure, except the [defence department] programme manager," says one biodefence analyst, who did not want to be named.
SOURCE: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Rudolph, who succeeded Galloway last September, controls the chemical and biological defence research budget, which includes standard drug- and vaccine-research programmes as well as the TMT. Rudolph is combining the TMT research money (see 'The cost of countermeasures') with that for traditional projects, and refocusing on four priorities: surveillance and diagnostics, sensors, countermeasures and decontamination technologies.
Rudolph has retained some TMT projects, such as the pathogen-sequencing studies led by Ian Lipkin of Columbia University in New York, who was a technical adviser on Contagion. But he has cut others, such as a five-year, $24.7-million contract awarded in 2008 to Peregrine Pharmaceuticals of Tustin, California, to find antibodies against haemorrhagic fevers. The TMT funding for AVI BioPharma's two clinical trials will continue, however, as the trials are managed separately by Hough.
Whether the dismantling of the TMT will improve the Pentagon's biodefence success rate remains to be seen, says Tom Inglesby at the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center in Baltimore, Maryland. "In the end, the question will be, 'Did Rudolph make progress in the time he was there with the money that he had?' Ultimately, he will be held accountable." 

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  • #26903
    WHAT A CHEAP SHOT,LISTEN AVI BIOPHARMA IS NOT AT ALL LIKE OTHER ANTISENSE COMPANIES FOR ONE .AVI BIOPHARMA CHANGED FROM A RESEARCH COMPANY IN 2007 TO A RESEARCH AND DRUG MAKER THEN.WHAT DO YOU EXPECT FROM A COMPANY THAT HAS JUST GOT IN TO FDA TRIALS A SHORT WHILE AGO FOR EBOLA/MARBURG.I AM WILLING TO BET YOUR FUTURE THAT AVI'S DRUGS WILL AVAIL BETTER FOR ANTIVIRALS THAN ANY OTHER TREATMENT ONCE THEY CAN GET THROUGH THESE NEVER ENDING FDA TRIALS.I THINK THE WRITTER HERE NEEDS TO RESEARCH CURRENT AFFAIRS ON WHOM IS TELLING MISS LEADING INFO TO THEM AND RESEARCH THE REAL CURRENT SCIENCE BEFORE SUCH A STORY.
  • #26904
    The anonymous source who claims "everybody knows antisense is a failure" should be telling that to the parents of the Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy boys now being dosed in the AVI trial for DMD that is the current best hope for these people. And it's generally expected to work, not fail. The same success is being encountered in the bioterrorism applications. If the writer had chosen to do a bit more looking into the programs than he's done for the reader here, he'd have known that too. But then he'd have had to write a very different article. Perhaps he should.
  • #26908
    I've worked in the oligonucleotide field for more than 20 years, and it's true there are only 2 approved drugs. So? The development of any new platform requires a lot of time, and the same was true of the monoclonal Ab field at the equivalent stage of development after the discovery of how to make monoclonal Ab in 1975 (the comparable starting date for antisense technology is the late 1980's, with the development of automated DNA synthesis). It's true that early antisense chemistries (phosphorothioate) had relatively poor antisense efficacy in humans, but I think it's inaccurate to say safety issues are holding the field back. Moreover, newer chemistries (like the morpholino used by AVI) show far more promise, and are effective (and well tolerated) in ongoing human clinical trials. The robust stage of this field is reflected in the fact that there are more than 10 compounds in phase 3 clincial development, and dozens in phase 2. I have my own biases, but the characterization of the antisense field as a "failure" is quite premature, and does not reflect an understanding of it's current state.
  • #26927
    Morpholino antisense oligos have shown their efficacy for gene knockdowns in biological research, where they are routinely used for knockdowns in embryos, primarily zebrafish and Xenopus. Other knockdown types, such as siRNA or phosphorothioate RNA (which gave the antisense field its bad reputation in the '80s-'90s), kill zebrafish embryos. Delivery of oligos into cells from the blood is still a problem in many cases, though the higher doses allowed by the non-toxicity of the Morpholino backbone can help drive delivery and the leakiness of cells with Duchenne muscular dystrophy has advantaged Morpholinos for treatment of that disease. I work for the company that manufactures Morpholinos for researchers, and from my perspective the Morpholino work at AVI BioPharma has great promise for DMD and, based on the published reports for their modified Morpholinos (PMO+) in viral knockdowns, they have a reasonable chance of clinical success.
  • #26929
    I have taught biochemistry for over 35 years and PMO's have been a tool I have used in the lab for the last 10 years. 1 year ago I reviewed the 2 ferret studies conducted by the DOD/Avi Biopharma utilizing the PMO+ chemistry and was taken aback by the antiviral effect of this chemistry. In the preferred animal model for influenza A [ferret] the PMO+ chemistry reduced the viral load in these mammals by a 5.9 LOG10. The positive control in these 2 studies was Tamiflu. Tamiflu treated ferrets had a reduction of viral load by the order of .54 LOG10. The PMO+ chemistry targets the conserved region of the influenza A virus resulting in the inability of the virus to successfully mutate around this antiviral. This antiviral will save lives. This brings me to why I felt compelled to respond to "The Nature's News" report that "unnamed" sources were appalled at the money thrown at this antiviral. Succinctly put, I can see why large pharma would want to sabotage the lifeline[money]for promising, small biotech incubators like Avi Biopharma but I don't understand why you would add credibility to these "unnamed sources" by publishing these slanderous comments. Data does not lie.
  • #26941
    Whoever made the above statement should study the pandemic of 1918, in which the USA military not only suffered an enormous number of deaths but were also credited in carrying the virus throughout the world due to WW1 troop movements.
    Virologists around the world agree that it is not a question of if highly virulent pandemics will again occur, but rather when!
    It will be far too late to develop quality treatments when the next pandemic happens. They must be developed now, regardless of the mutation.
    Fortunately, TMT has had the insight to understand and take action.
  • #26943
    When fighting unforseen pathogens, the idea is to find a rapidly adaptable technology that works broadly. That is the justification for targeting flu. If a medical countermeasure proves safe and effective against flu, we can be confident in its ability to be adapted to fight other viruses in the event of possible biological attacks or natural outbreaks. The author makes no mention of the successful rapid-response exercises that have been conducted. The development of this ability, which is crucial in our country's readiness, and the outcome of the current human safety trials should be the measure of TMT's success. Furthermore, just getting drugs to human safety trials should be applauded because this is not easy when dealing with relatively new technologies. The opinions of an unnamed analyst who's motives are unknown, to me is not worth much. Also, an agency created only 5 years ago that has not produced a new FDA-approved drug should not be considered a failure because the timeline for getting new drugs to market is much longer than 5 years. Erika Check Hayden should at least offer alternative strategies that could be employed to ready the nation for biological threats. Or at least the unnamed sources should be able to offer up some ideas.
    The author also seems to be confused with two concepts: One where an emergency (Such as in Contagion) causes the government to bypass normal standards and rush a drug to production in order to stave off disaster. The other, is what we currently have: An agency helping along a technology through the long, expensive process of development before an emergency hits. So, contrary to the lede of the story, TMT has not spent 5 years and failed to produce a treatment for a deadly virus. In fact, it took much less time than "a few months" like in Contagion. The drugs for Ebola, Marburg and now influenza all were created by Avi-biopharma in a matter of days and are now being tested for safety. Avi-biopharma has also created several other drugs using the same technology during rapid-response exercises, all of which could conceivably be used in an emergency, but will need funding in order to go to clinical trials.

Published online 21 September 2011 | Nature 477, 390-393 (2011) | doi:10.1038/477390a
News Feature

Bombs' hidden impact: The brain war

Wartime explosions may be creating an epidemic of brain damage — and a major challenge for scientists.
The high-pressure shock waves generated by the detonation of roadside bombs can cause invisible damage to the brain.M. ROMANA/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
To Burt, the blasts he experienced in Afghanistan eventually became a kind of music. The detonation of C4 and other such military-grade explosives felt like extremely high notes — painful, yet over quickly. But blasts from bombs made out of fertilizer — a favourite of Afghan insurgents — were like standing next to a speaker at a rock concert: the dull bass thuds didn't necessarily hurt, but they would reverberate through his body like a wave, and stay with him for a long time afterwards.
They're with him still. Burt, who asks that his real name not be used, spent four months as a tactical adviser to a US military bomb-disposal unit in Afghanistan, during which he was within 50 metres of a detonating improvised explosive device (IED) more than 18 times. His sleeping problems began even before he left. So did the headaches, the ringing in his ears and the nausea. He started to forget things — a problem that got even worse after he returned home. Burt would find himself in a room in his house and wonder why he was there. One time, he told his wife they should try a new restaurant in town. She replied that they had eaten there with friends just a few days before.
As recently as two years ago, this constellation of symptoms might have been diagnosed as a classic case of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a psychological condition that can be caused by the constant stress of being in combat. But Burt, now on medical leave, blames those low notes. He is convinced that the body-shaking blasts did something to his brain. And many doctors, medical researchers and military officials have come to believe he is right.
The visible toll of insurgent-made IEDs has been awful enough. In the ten years since military operations began in Afghanistan and then Iraq, IEDs have killed more than 3,000 US and allied troops, and wounded roughly ten times that number. But many more troops have been exposed to multiple blasts and not suffered any visible physical injuries. Like Burt, they often report an array of symptoms, ranging from sleep disturbance to problems concentrating. And an increasing body of evidence suggests that the repeated concussions have left them with an invisible, subcellular-level form of traumatic brain injury (TBI) that not only impairs their day-to-day functioning, but also increases their long-term risk of developing neurodegenerative diseases.
"We've got a lot of guys out there that might be 30 years old that have been blown up a dozen times," says Kevin Kit Parker, a biomedical engineer at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who is conducting research on TBI. "And the risk that these guys are going to get a disease like Alzheimer's or Parkinson's is soaring."
The number of troops affected by this kind of silent TBI has already topped 200,000, according to the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center in Washington DC. A survey done by the Rand Corporation, a not-for-profit research firm in Santa Monica, California, suggests it could be as high as 320,000. The Pentagon and the US Department of Veterans Affairs, which are responsible for the health care of current and former troops, respectively, are getting worried about a potential epidemic of disability and dementia. The disorder also presents a major challenge for researchers.
No one fully understands what the blast waves are doing to the brain, explains Walter Koroshetz, deputy director of the US National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke in Bethesda, Maryland. Thanks to mounting evidence from professional sports, he says, "it's been known for a long time that repetitive head injuries lead to chronic degenerative disease. But no one has really got a hold on how that happens." Worse, he says, coming up with an effective treatment, and not just alleviating symptoms, could take years: some 20 compounds and interventions have been tested in more than 50 trials in the past 30 years. "People just look at this field and turn around and run," Koroshetz says.

Playing catch-up

The good news is that the Pentagon has finally begun to put a high priority on understanding, diagnosing and treating these injuries. But, as officials there now admit, it is playing catch-up after too many years of ignoring the problem.
"The system of care was really in denial for the longest time," says Colonel Christian Macedonia, a physician with the US Army who serves as medical-sciences adviser to Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Partly this was just the culture of the military, says Macedonia: because most soldiers dazed by a blast wave seemed to recover very quickly — on the surface — the attitude was, "Hey, shake it off".
When the symptoms did begin to show, he says, troops with TBI were often misdiagnosed as having PTSD, which has similar symptoms. And veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan have all too often been exposed to physical and psychological traumas that could easily cause both.
“People just look at this field and turn and run.”
But most of all, Macedonia thinks that the reluctance to recognize silent TBI was "the ghost of the Gulf War" — the ongoing scientific controversy around the diffuse symptoms described by many troops who served in the 1991 conflict. Study after study has failed to identify a root cause for Gulf War syndrome, he says, so when people started coming forward with TBI — yet another constellation of complaints that could not be linked to a single cause — the frustrated military-medicine hierarchy just didn't want to hear about it.
That attitude didn't begin to shift until senior military leaders began to sense a dissonance between the official reports they were being given and what they saw when visiting injured troops. One crucial moment came in 2009 when Marine Corps commandant General James Amos toured Walter Reed Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, and was introduced to a patient who said, with considerable effort, "General, I know who you are. I have a picture of you and I together in Iraq."
It turned out that Amos had a copy of the picture, too. It had been taken just two years earlier, when he had posed with a group of marines who had just survived an IED that had detonated directly under their vehicle. Thanks to the vehicle's advanced armour, all of them seemed unscathed. But this young man, a bomb-disposal expert, went straight back to work and was quickly exposed to several more blasts. His physical condition deteriorated rapidly, his life began to unravel and — after some difficulty getting the military medical establishment to recognize his TBI — he had been admitted to Walter Reed with severe neurological problems.
Amos describes the meeting as a seminal moment for him. "This TBI business is real, and we've got to get past the point of ignoring it," he recalls of his reaction. "We need to do something about it."
“This TBI business is real, and we've got to get past the point of ignoring it.”
Mullen was coming to much the same conclusion. Concerned that he wasn't getting a full picture of the brain-injury problem, he asked Macedonia to help organize a 'Gray Team' of researchers and medical professionals with combat experience to look at the realities of TBI on the battlefield.
The Gray Team (named after the brain's grey matter) made its first visit to Afghanistan in 2009, says Macedonia, and quickly concluded that Mullen's suspicions were well founded. Official reports had claimed that more than 90% of troops with concussion were being assessed with the 13-point Military Acute Concussion Evaluation (MACE). But when the Gray Team travelled to Afghanistan, the group found that the vast majority of medical professionals — in both large military hospitals and remote outposts — didn't even know what a MACE was. "Doctors couldn't tell you the first thing about it, even though they had all the training materials," says Macedonia. No one was enforcing the screening.
In parallel with the efforts of the Gray Team, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Office of Naval Research were sponsoring a study that for the first time sought to understand how the brain is affected by blast waves, which may cause different injuries from the blunt-force trauma seen in sports injuries. The study focused on breachers: marines who specialize in using explosives to enter buildings. The first paper is only now going through review, but researchers say that they have found evidence of neurological impairment in the instructors, who have had long-term, repeated exposure to low-level blasts.
On 21 June 2010, guided in part by the breacher study, the Pentagon announced its first policies for identifying and treating people who may have TBI. Included were the first military-wide mandatory triggers for screening troops, including a rule that anyone within 50 metres of a blast had to be evaluated for signs of brain injury.

The research scramble

The Pentagon has also started to make up for its long neglect of brain-injury research. The Department of Defense's Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs, one of the major conduits for medical-research funding, provided no money specifically for TBI or PTSD between 1999 and 2005. In fiscal year 2006, a small amount, US$3.7 million, went to PTSD, but TBI was not even listed as a research topic. In 2007, however, mounting reports of battlefield brain injuries persuaded Congress to allocate $150 million for TBI research, with another $150 million for PTSD research.
The US military is experimenting with the use of electroencephalography during the baseline pre-deployment testing of its troops.The US military is experimenting with the use of electroencephalography during the baseline pre-deployment testing of its troops.J. ANDERSON/AP
That influx of money was enough to open the door to people such as Parker, one of the few medical researchers working on TBI who has combat experience. His research focus had been on cardiac cell mechanics. But in 2002, he served the first of his two tours of duty as an infantry officer in Afghanistan and began to see the effects of TBI on his fellow soldiers. The bombs then were still relatively small and unsophisticated — artillery shells hooked up to garage-door openers, for instance. But by the time of his second tour in 2009, troops were encountering 200-kilogram fertilizer bombs that could blow unarmoured vehicles to smithereens. As he puts it, only half jokingly, once people started trying to kill him with IEDs, "I figured I had better turn into some kind of neuroscientist".
In fact, Parker's first formal involvement with brain-injury research began when he attended a DARPA workshop on the subject in 2005. There he learned that one of the challenges was to understand the effects of an explosive blast on the brain. With his background in cell mechanics, Parker immediately began to wonder about integrins, receptors that mediate the cell's attachment to surrounding tissue. Could a blast wave damage them enough to disrupt the proteins' functioning?
The idea got a cool reception at first, says Parker, who is now a member of the Gray Team. "The community that does neuroscience and understands cell mechanics is non-existent," he says. "It's like if you're used to reading English and I hand you a paper in Mandarin Chinese: it's going to be kind of difficult." But a grant from DARPA allowed Parker and his group to develop an in vitro model to test his idea. And in July, his team published a paper showing that the idea is essentially correct: blast-induced brain injury sets off a cellular chain reaction that disrupts integrin signalling, impairing connections among the brain's neurons (M. A. Hemphill et al. PLoS ONE 6, e22899; 2011).
The increased funding has also led to progress towards a blood test for diagnosing silent TBI. Currently, clinicians can only infer the presence of such brain damage by cognitive-impairment tests. This means that, because the symptoms overlap with those of other disorders, brain-injury researchers can't always be sure about what they're measuring — and patients might not be receiving the most appropriate care. Now, after looking at a variety of proteins that seem to become elevated in the bloodstream after a brain injury, army-funded researchers tested two that seemed especially promising in small-scale, phase II clinical trials. Known as ubiquitin C-terminal hydrolase (UCH-L1) and glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP), they will soon be tested in large-scale, phase III trials.
Working independently of the Pentagon, Bennet Omalu, a forensic pathologist at the University of California, Davis, and the chief medical examiner for San Joaquin County in California, has started to look at veterans' brains for chronic traumatic encephalopathy. First identified in professional athletes involved in contact sports, this neurodegenerative disorder is believed to be caused by multiple concussions. In November, Omalu expects to publish what may be the first case study demonstrating chronic traumatic encephalopathy in a military veteran with silent TBI.
Click for larger image.
The young man had been exposed to multiple blasts during two deployments to Iraq, explains Omalu, who in 2005 published the first evidence of chronic traumatic encephalopathy, which he had identified from autopsy samples from an American football player (B. I. Omalu et al. Neurosurgery 57, 128–134; 2005). After returning home, the man began to experience memory problems, mood disorders and self-control problems. Then, aged 27, he committed suicide. With the permission of his relatives, says Omalu, "I got his brain, examined it, and lo and behold, he had CTE changes" — abnormal accumulations of the tau protein associated with Alzheimer's disease and other dementias (see 'Trauma in the brain').

Limited access

Few medical researchers working on brain injuries have an easy way to collaborate with the Pentagon. Its unique combination of bureaucracy and national-security considerations prevents access to many data and brain-tissue samples that could be useful for medical researchers. For example, access to the Pentagon's Joint Theater Trauma Registry — a compilation of all military trauma-related data — is highly restricted, lest enemies use the information to improve their ability to injure US soldiers. "Giving the NIH access is not impossible, but it is very, very difficult," says Major General James Gilman, who heads the US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command at Fort Detrick, Maryland.
There have been some signs of change. A joint programme by the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, both in Bethesda, recently hired a neuropathologist specifically to look at brain tissue of deceased troops, although access to the tissue is not yet guaranteed. Also, the Pentagon and the NIH agreed in August to develop a database for TBI that is similar to the ones created for Alzheimer's disease, autism and cancer research. The idea is to standardize data collection across studies so that researchers can compare results more easily.
Among other things, such comparisons should help investigators to get a clearer picture of how well TBI therapies work. They need as much help as they can get, says Koroshetz: for all the progress in understanding the causes and progression of silent TBI, treatments remain elusive. Dozens of clinical trials have been done over the past two decades, looking at everything from antioxidants to hyperbaric oxygen. "No one has been able to figure out how to make a difference," says Koroshetz. "In terms of outcomes in patients, there is very little, if any, evidence that any single thing works."
The Pentagon has come a long way from just three years ago, when TBI was mostly ignored. In January, it became mandatory for the military to track all concussive injuries, and troops now receive pre-deployment cognitive testing that can be used as a baseline in case they are later affected by concussion. Experiments with brain-wave measurements are also under way. And with the new reporting requirements, the military is creating what is likely to be the single largest repository of data on TBI.
The question is how to keep the momentum going. That may prove difficult, given the United States' mounting budget woes. After the initial boost in 2007, funding levels for TBI research dropped dramatically. In fiscal year 2011, the congressional appropriation specifically for the Pentagon's brain-injury research is expected to be just $45 million. "Where's the interest, where's the support, where's the national effort?" asks Colonel Dallas Hack, director of the army's Combat Casualty Care Research Program at Fort Detrick.
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Brigadier General Robert Thomas, the army's assistant surgeon-general, hopes that the military's involvement is now doing for research and treatment of brain injuries what it has done in the past for yellow fever, trauma care and medical evacuation. For better or worse, he says, "combat is the greatest catalyst to medical innovation".
But in the meantime, Burt and the hundreds of thousands of other people with brain injuries can only hope that progress comes in time to help them. Once an ambitious multi-tasker, Burt says he now has problems with basic tasks. These days, he can get around the house, and even manage trips to the store — as long as he makes lists or uses some other form of reminder. "But I will never be what I was," he says. 
See Editorial page 369
Sharon Weinberger is a Carnegie fellow at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism.

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Military surveillance data: Shared intelligence

The military has a vast array of scientifically valuable data — some more accessible than you think.
No one monitors our planet more closely than the military. Thirty-six thousand kilometres above Earth, US Air Force satellites watch for the heat plume of a ballistic missile. An array of other surveillance satellites patrol lower altitudes. Some can see a rifle from space; others penetrate cloud cover with radar, seeking military hardware or installations. Still closer in, aircraft and drones fly over conflict zones collecting intelligence, and seismometers listen for shudders from an underground nuclear test. Even the deepest oceans are prowled by military submarines, watching their foreign adversaries.
Through most of their history, the data collected by this vast blanket of military sensors have been highly classified. But on occasions when scientists are lucky enough to see the data, their view is considerably different from that of the generals. Satellites designed to track missiles can also spot the flaming trails of meteors; aerial photographs of Iraq have allowed archaeologists to trace ancient canals. Even the military's most banal weather satellites collect data on ocean precipitation that are valuable for understanding Earth's energy cycles.
After the cold war, some of these data did start trickling out to scientists, mainly in the United States, which has vast military resources and a vibrant scientific community. The flow ebbed after 2000 — but there are hints that it is resuming, and that more fruitful data collaborations are to come. A group of security-cleared scientists called MEDEA has recently rekindled ties with the US intelligence community to discuss the use of military environmental data for the study of climate change. And an agreement set to be finalized in October between NASA and the US Air Force will give astronomers unprecedented access to data on meteors entering the atmosphere. Some details of those data must be obfuscated to preserve state secrets, but researchers say that the trove nonetheless has enormous scientific potential. "I think it's become more useful now than it ever has been before," says John Orcutt, an oceanographer at the University of California, San Diego, and a member of MEDEA.
In the United States, the start of the Manhattan Project in 1942 set the tone for collaboration between the modern military and civilian scientists. The greatest physicists of the era, conscripted to build the atomic bomb, spent years working closely with the US Army. The Pentagon has used outside scientists to help shape its capabilities ever since. It maintains a handful of quasi-academic labs near university campuses, and a truculent panel of independent scientists — known as the JASONs — advises it on technical topics such as submarine detection and nuclear weapons (see page 397).
At the same time, opportunistic collaborations have sprung up between civilian scientists and the defence establishment. With the advent of nuclear submarine warfare in the 1950s, the US Navy devoted enormous resources to mapping and understanding the sea floor — including mid-ocean ridges, where Navy mapping yielded clues to the theory of plate tectonics, according to Raymond Jeanloz, an Earth scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, and a long-time member of the JASONs. Seismic networks used to monitor nuclear tests have also mapped earthquakes. Jeffrey Richelson, a historian at the National Security Archive in Washington DC, says that since the 1970s, the US defence department has occasionally shared satellite imagery with civilian agencies in response to natural disasters such as flooding and forest fires.
But the military's most sensitive data remained off-limits to academics. In 1967, for example, early-warning radar in Alaska spotted pulsars — rotating stars that emit a pulsing radio signal — months before any civilian astronomers did. The staff sergeant who made the observations kept quiet about his discovery for 40 years, until the sightings were declassified in 20071.
After the end of the cold war, restrictions began to loosen. In the mid-1990s, astronomers struck up an ad hoc arrangement with Air Force Space Command in which they could ask for data on specific meteors that had been collected by missile-warning satellites. At around the same time, Al Gore, then a Democratic senator from Tennessee, began to ask what the intelligence community could offer climate scientists. Gore was interested in environmental issues and had also served on intelligence and military committees in Congress. He wrote to Robert Gates, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, prompting Gates to invite a group of scientists to gain security clearance and take a look at what the military had to offer. After Gore took office as Bill Clinton's vice-president in 1993, the group solidified under the name MEDEA — Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis.
"With the proper justification, I could ask for almost anything," says William Schlesinger, a MEDEA member and president of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies in Millbrook, New York. Schlesinger used reconnaissance imagery going back to the Second World War to search for climate change's influence on desertification of the Sahara (he didn't find any)2.

Trade secrets

MEDEA did succeed in getting intelligence satellites to systematically photograph locations of environmental interest in the Arctic, Antarctic and the continental United States. In 1995, the group also successfully lobbied for the release of images from early photo-reconnaissance satellites Corona, Argon and Lanyard, which took more than 860,000 photographs of Earth between 1960 and 1972, recorded on rolls of film. Since then, an entire cottage industry has sprung up involving archaeologists who search for roads and other ancient features in the photos, many of which show tracts of land that have since been consumed by urban sprawl. Jason Ur, an archaeologist at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, has used them to map massive canals dug by ancient Assyrian kings3 (see 'Spying on an ancient city').
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In the late 1990s, work by Gore and MEDEA led the United States and Russia to declassify Arctic-sea-ice data recorded between the 1970s and 1990s by satellites, submarines and other sources. Scientists have since been able to use those data to reconstruct the gradual thinning of Arctic ice in the decades before civilian monitoring began. "Without the early classified data, people wouldn't have a clue," says Ralph Cicerone, the president of the US National Academy of Sciences.
Then, around 2000, MEDEA abruptly halted its work and, in 2009, the informal meteor data from the Air Force stopped flowing too. No one really knows why. But such twists and turns are the price of working with the intelligence community. As Schlesinger puts it, researchers aren't privy to the "darkened world where a bunch of people make a decision".
Sharing will never be a priority for those charged with defending the United States, says Steven Aftergood, who heads the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington DC and has spent decades tracking the US intelligence agencies. Even if information is unclassified, agencies may not want to dole it out freely — or devote resources to converting it into formats that scientists can use. "No organization spontaneously discloses and shares its information; that's just a bureaucratic law of physics," Aftergood says. Political pressure, such as that applied by Gore, is key to persuading intelligence agencies to share data, he says.
“With the proper justification, i could ask for almost anything.”
These days, new collaborations are emerging. In 2008, congressional committees concerned about climate change quietly reconvened MEDEA to examine whether military- and intelligence-community assets could supply environmental data. The answer was yes, according to Cicerone, who has served as informal chair of MEDEA since 2008. Although intelligence satellites aren't as useful as custom-built instruments, the panel concluded that they could fill some gaps in climate data gathered by civilian satellites, particularly given recent budget shortfalls and launch failures such as the loss of the NASA Orbiting Carbon Observatory in February 20094.
Also in 2009, MEDEA persuaded intelligence officials to publicly share images of areas of environmental interest that had, by that time, been photographed regularly for more than a decade. The images are now archived as the Global Fiducials Library, available through the US Geological Survey (USGS). Orcutt says they are "relatively priceless at this point" because they are gathered roughly once every few weeks — more frequently and continuously than those from civilian research satellites.
Lindley Johnson, who oversees NASA's Near-Earth Object Observation programme, believes that the space policy unveiled in 2010 by US President Barack Obama, which explicitly endorses data sharing, may have smoothed his efforts to secure data from the US Air Force. Johnson says the new arrangement, which will give astronomers access to data from missile-warning satellites on all meteors — not just the ones researchers knew about already — will allow scientists to gain a better understanding of the range of near-Earth objects in orbit.
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How much science will emerge from these burgeoning relationships remains to be seen. So far, the newly available image libraries of the Arctic and Antarctic have seen only modest use from scientists. "One of our biggest challenges is to educate the science community about the existence of our programme," says Bruce Molnia, executive director of the Civil Applications Committee at the USGS in Reston, Virginia, which oversees civilian use of classified image data. And the members of MEDEA, who have access to the full array of classified data, are, for now at least, using it to address policy questions raised by government agencies — such as what national security risks are posed by climate change — rather than conducting fundamental research of their own choosing.
Yet Cicerone is hopeful that even more of the intelligence data being collected can eventually be shared. It is now feasible to save almost everything that the military's eyes and ears are recording about Earth. "As scientists, we don't want observations to be thrown away," he says. "With the Earth, as time passes, you just get one shot at it." 
See Editorial page 369
Geoff Brumfiel is a senior reporter for Nature in London.
  • References

    1. Brumfiel, G. Nature 448, 974-975 (2007). | Article | PubMed | ISI | ChemPort |
    2. Schlesinger, W. H. & Gramenopoulos, N. Global Change Biol. 2, 137-141 (1996). | Article | ISI |
    3. Ur, J. A. Iraq 67, 317-345 (2005).
    4. Brumfiel, G. Nature 457, 1067 (2009). | Article | PubMed | ISI | ChemPort |

wer of the Pentagon: The changing face of military science

Basic research funded by the Pentagon is facing an uncertain future.
In 2005, as roadside bomb attacks were claiming ever more lives in Iraq, senior Pentagon officials called on the academic community to join a 'Manhattan Project' to counter these improvised explosive devices. By invoking the Second World War race to build the atomic bomb, military leaders seemed to be pushing for a massive investment in science that could, like the first nuclear weapon, turn the tide of war.
Academics responded with a collective shrug. The Pentagon's grand rhetoric wasn't matched with any great influx of funding for science, and it wasn't clear how any one technology could help fight a loosely organized, deliberately low-tech enemy. Besides, says Julia Erdley, deputy science adviser to the Pentagon's Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, "we are looking for near-term solutions".
Six years later, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent more than US$17 billion on countering improvised explosive devices, but, as Erdley suggests, the vast majority of that money has gone on implementing known solutions such as stronger armour for vehicles and personnel, not advanced research. Roadside bombs remain the single biggest killer of US and allied troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pentagon officials now admit that there is no technological 'silver bullet' for preventing, detecting and disarming roadside bombs, and their Manhattan project rhetoric has long since been replaced with more sober talk of disrupting highly distributed terrorist networks (see Nature 471, 566–568; 2011).
The failure to mobilize the scientific community for the war on terror stands in stark contrast to what happened in the cold war, when Pentagon-supported science boomed, and was viewed as a crucial asset to counter Soviet technological prowess. Today's military has to operate in much more ambiguous and complex environments, in which 'soft' skills such as trust-building, intelligence-gathering and cultural insight may prove as decisive as any technological advantage. Given this new military reality, it is becoming less clear what science and technology research has to offer.

Broken programmes

That uncertainty may help to explain what some now see as a lack of sustained Pentagon support for blue-sky basic science and a preference for applied research with a short-term pay-off. "We believe that important aspects of the DoD basic research programs are 'broken' to an extent that neither throwing more money at these problems nor simple changes in procedures and definitions will fix them," wrote the JASONs, a defence advisory group made up of independent scientists, in the most recent publicly available assessment of Pentagon science and technology. (Completed in 2009, the JASON report was released to the public in May 2010.)
On the surface, the Pentagon's science base looks healthy enough, and it supports a vast array of research (see page 369). The science and technology budget, which consists of basic research, applied research and advanced technology development — budget categories 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 in Pentagon parlance — has fallen from its post-11 September 2001 peak in 2005, when it reached some $14.7 billion per year (see 'Rise and fall'). But most of that decline came in the advanced-technology category, not basic research. And the total still stands at about $12 billion a year, nearly twice the $6.8 billion budget of the US National Science Foundation, and much higher than defence science expenditures in Europe, where countries have traditionally spent only a fraction of what the United States spends on the military. In 2009, the most recent year for which figures are available, the members of European Defence Agency — every country in the European Union except Denmark — spent an aggregate of only €2.26 billion (US$3.1 billion) in the 'research and technology' category, the vast majority of which goes to the development of advanced aircraft and other weaponry, not science.
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Pentagon research also had a champion in former US defence secretary Robert Gates, a one-time CIA director who had been president of Texas A&M University in College Station before he came to the DOD in 2006.
For example, Gates was well aware that in many academic fields, notably the social sciences, relations with the military have been fraught and often hostile since the Vietnam War (1955–75). In 2008, hoping to rebuild those ties, Gates proposed Minerva: a basic-science programme that would specifically focus on the social sciences. Gates saw Minerva as emblematic of military science's changing mission. "The challenges facing the world require a much broader conception and application of national power than just military prowess," he said in announcing the programme. "The government and the Department of Defense need to engage additional intellectual disciplines — such as history, anthropology, sociology and evolutionary psychology."

Magnificent seven

Beginning with the president's fiscal year 2012 budget request this past February, Gates set a target of 2% annual growth in the basic-science budget over the coming years, and pledged to hold the applied- and advanced-technology accounts steady. That was particularly heartening news for those disciplines to which defence funding is crucial. About one-third of all the funding for oceanography research and computer science in the United States comes from the Pentagon, for example, as does a majority of the funding for mechanical engineering (see Nature 466, 656–657; 2010). "Physics research is no longer tied so exclusively to military funding," says David Kaiser, a historian of science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, "although it still has a large role." And the defence department is also now the largest single source of funding for research into traumatic brain injury (see page 390).
Shortly before stepping down on 30 June this year, Gates signed off a new science and technology plan for the Pentagon. The policy includes a list of priorities — which Pentagon insiders immediately dubbed the 'magnificent seven' — to be used for budget planning over the next five years.
And yet, Gates's efforts also illustrate some of the many strains in the Pentagon's science and technology programme. Minerva, in particular, has met with decidedly mixed reactions, as academics question whether the Pentagon has any business setting the course of social-science research (see Nature 455, 583–585; 2008). And the magnificent-seven list, which includes topics such as research to counter weapons of mass destruction, and engineering resilient systems, arguably hasn't done much to inspire the scientific community. "It would be hard to categorize it as bold or prescient," says Mark Lewis, an aerospace engineer at the University of Maryland in College Park and a former chief scientist of the US Air Force. It is essentially a compendium of the individual military services' wish lists. A Pentagon spokesperson also says that there are no funding goals tied to the magnificent seven.
A more fundamental issue is what many observers see as a lack of high-level vision and coordination for Pentagon research. In earlier decades, that coordination was carried out by the director for defence research and engineering (DDR&E), a position established in 1958 after the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite. Located in the Pentagon's power centre — the Office of the Secretary of Defense — this director oversaw all of the department's science and technology programmes.
But in the late 1970s, the position ceded much of its authority over budget and policy to the under secretary for acquisition — the chief weapons buyer. The DDR&E, recently renamed the assistant secretary of defence for research and engineering, was left with a limited staff, overseeing a vast portfolio of science accounts at the individual services and the Pentagon-wide Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. In recent years, the office has become marginalized, with its staff fending off spending cuts in the science budget, rather than being a driving force in military science policy.
And even when the office succeeds in defending basic research, according to the 2009 JASON report, the research inexorably gets pushed towards immediate applications. In a sample of 258 basic-research projects funded by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research in 2007, and a similar sample funded by the Army Research Office, the group found that as many as 81% "are not, even by a generous stretch, 6.1 research".
The JASONs urged the defence department to elevate and strengthen the DDR&E office, and make it independent of weapons acquisition. But the defence-department bureaucracy has given no sign that any such change is in the offing.
In the meantime, the Pentagon faces a more urgent threat. "We're starting to see a downward trend in R&D funding," says Todd Harrison, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington DC. The Obama administration has already asked the Pentagon to cut $400 billion from its budgets over the next 12 years — the current budget is about $700 billion per year — and there's no guarantee that those cuts won't be expanded as Congress struggles to trim the US federal deficit, or that the money won't come from the science and technology budget.
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Lewis sees Gates's commitment to increasing basic-science spending as one of the most important changes in the Pentagon's science policy over the past few years. The question now, however, is whether Gates's successor, former CIA director Leon Panetta, will uphold that commitment. Lewis points to the new defence secretary's confirmation hearings on Capitol Hill, when he was specifically asked that question. Panetta replied that he valued basic research — but that "all defence appropriations must be considered during this time of budget constraints".
In other words, everything is on the table for cuts, including science. "That would be a profound change," says Lewis. 
See Editorial page 369