sábado, 24 de setembro de 2011


Military surveillance data: Shared intelligence

The military has a vast array of scientifically valuable data — some more accessible than you think.
No one monitors our planet more closely than the military. Thirty-six thousand kilometres above Earth, US Air Force satellites watch for the heat plume of a ballistic missile. An array of other surveillance satellites patrol lower altitudes. Some can see a rifle from space; others penetrate cloud cover with radar, seeking military hardware or installations. Still closer in, aircraft and drones fly over conflict zones collecting intelligence, and seismometers listen for shudders from an underground nuclear test. Even the deepest oceans are prowled by military submarines, watching their foreign adversaries.
Through most of their history, the data collected by this vast blanket of military sensors have been highly classified. But on occasions when scientists are lucky enough to see the data, their view is considerably different from that of the generals. Satellites designed to track missiles can also spot the flaming trails of meteors; aerial photographs of Iraq have allowed archaeologists to trace ancient canals. Even the military's most banal weather satellites collect data on ocean precipitation that are valuable for understanding Earth's energy cycles.
After the cold war, some of these data did start trickling out to scientists, mainly in the United States, which has vast military resources and a vibrant scientific community. The flow ebbed after 2000 — but there are hints that it is resuming, and that more fruitful data collaborations are to come. A group of security-cleared scientists called MEDEA has recently rekindled ties with the US intelligence community to discuss the use of military environmental data for the study of climate change. And an agreement set to be finalized in October between NASA and the US Air Force will give astronomers unprecedented access to data on meteors entering the atmosphere. Some details of those data must be obfuscated to preserve state secrets, but researchers say that the trove nonetheless has enormous scientific potential. "I think it's become more useful now than it ever has been before," says John Orcutt, an oceanographer at the University of California, San Diego, and a member of MEDEA.
In the United States, the start of the Manhattan Project in 1942 set the tone for collaboration between the modern military and civilian scientists. The greatest physicists of the era, conscripted to build the atomic bomb, spent years working closely with the US Army. The Pentagon has used outside scientists to help shape its capabilities ever since. It maintains a handful of quasi-academic labs near university campuses, and a truculent panel of independent scientists — known as the JASONs — advises it on technical topics such as submarine detection and nuclear weapons (see page 397).
At the same time, opportunistic collaborations have sprung up between civilian scientists and the defence establishment. With the advent of nuclear submarine warfare in the 1950s, the US Navy devoted enormous resources to mapping and understanding the sea floor — including mid-ocean ridges, where Navy mapping yielded clues to the theory of plate tectonics, according to Raymond Jeanloz, an Earth scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, and a long-time member of the JASONs. Seismic networks used to monitor nuclear tests have also mapped earthquakes. Jeffrey Richelson, a historian at the National Security Archive in Washington DC, says that since the 1970s, the US defence department has occasionally shared satellite imagery with civilian agencies in response to natural disasters such as flooding and forest fires.
But the military's most sensitive data remained off-limits to academics. In 1967, for example, early-warning radar in Alaska spotted pulsars — rotating stars that emit a pulsing radio signal — months before any civilian astronomers did. The staff sergeant who made the observations kept quiet about his discovery for 40 years, until the sightings were declassified in 20071.
After the end of the cold war, restrictions began to loosen. In the mid-1990s, astronomers struck up an ad hoc arrangement with Air Force Space Command in which they could ask for data on specific meteors that had been collected by missile-warning satellites. At around the same time, Al Gore, then a Democratic senator from Tennessee, began to ask what the intelligence community could offer climate scientists. Gore was interested in environmental issues and had also served on intelligence and military committees in Congress. He wrote to Robert Gates, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, prompting Gates to invite a group of scientists to gain security clearance and take a look at what the military had to offer. After Gore took office as Bill Clinton's vice-president in 1993, the group solidified under the name MEDEA — Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis.
"With the proper justification, I could ask for almost anything," says William Schlesinger, a MEDEA member and president of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies in Millbrook, New York. Schlesinger used reconnaissance imagery going back to the Second World War to search for climate change's influence on desertification of the Sahara (he didn't find any)2.

Trade secrets

MEDEA did succeed in getting intelligence satellites to systematically photograph locations of environmental interest in the Arctic, Antarctic and the continental United States. In 1995, the group also successfully lobbied for the release of images from early photo-reconnaissance satellites Corona, Argon and Lanyard, which took more than 860,000 photographs of Earth between 1960 and 1972, recorded on rolls of film. Since then, an entire cottage industry has sprung up involving archaeologists who search for roads and other ancient features in the photos, many of which show tracts of land that have since been consumed by urban sprawl. Jason Ur, an archaeologist at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, has used them to map massive canals dug by ancient Assyrian kings3 (see 'Spying on an ancient city').
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In the late 1990s, work by Gore and MEDEA led the United States and Russia to declassify Arctic-sea-ice data recorded between the 1970s and 1990s by satellites, submarines and other sources. Scientists have since been able to use those data to reconstruct the gradual thinning of Arctic ice in the decades before civilian monitoring began. "Without the early classified data, people wouldn't have a clue," says Ralph Cicerone, the president of the US National Academy of Sciences.
Then, around 2000, MEDEA abruptly halted its work and, in 2009, the informal meteor data from the Air Force stopped flowing too. No one really knows why. But such twists and turns are the price of working with the intelligence community. As Schlesinger puts it, researchers aren't privy to the "darkened world where a bunch of people make a decision".
Sharing will never be a priority for those charged with defending the United States, says Steven Aftergood, who heads the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington DC and has spent decades tracking the US intelligence agencies. Even if information is unclassified, agencies may not want to dole it out freely — or devote resources to converting it into formats that scientists can use. "No organization spontaneously discloses and shares its information; that's just a bureaucratic law of physics," Aftergood says. Political pressure, such as that applied by Gore, is key to persuading intelligence agencies to share data, he says.
“With the proper justification, i could ask for almost anything.”
These days, new collaborations are emerging. In 2008, congressional committees concerned about climate change quietly reconvened MEDEA to examine whether military- and intelligence-community assets could supply environmental data. The answer was yes, according to Cicerone, who has served as informal chair of MEDEA since 2008. Although intelligence satellites aren't as useful as custom-built instruments, the panel concluded that they could fill some gaps in climate data gathered by civilian satellites, particularly given recent budget shortfalls and launch failures such as the loss of the NASA Orbiting Carbon Observatory in February 20094.
Also in 2009, MEDEA persuaded intelligence officials to publicly share images of areas of environmental interest that had, by that time, been photographed regularly for more than a decade. The images are now archived as the Global Fiducials Library, available through the US Geological Survey (USGS). Orcutt says they are "relatively priceless at this point" because they are gathered roughly once every few weeks — more frequently and continuously than those from civilian research satellites.
Lindley Johnson, who oversees NASA's Near-Earth Object Observation programme, believes that the space policy unveiled in 2010 by US President Barack Obama, which explicitly endorses data sharing, may have smoothed his efforts to secure data from the US Air Force. Johnson says the new arrangement, which will give astronomers access to data from missile-warning satellites on all meteors — not just the ones researchers knew about already — will allow scientists to gain a better understanding of the range of near-Earth objects in orbit.
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How much science will emerge from these burgeoning relationships remains to be seen. So far, the newly available image libraries of the Arctic and Antarctic have seen only modest use from scientists. "One of our biggest challenges is to educate the science community about the existence of our programme," says Bruce Molnia, executive director of the Civil Applications Committee at the USGS in Reston, Virginia, which oversees civilian use of classified image data. And the members of MEDEA, who have access to the full array of classified data, are, for now at least, using it to address policy questions raised by government agencies — such as what national security risks are posed by climate change — rather than conducting fundamental research of their own choosing.
Yet Cicerone is hopeful that even more of the intelligence data being collected can eventually be shared. It is now feasible to save almost everything that the military's eyes and ears are recording about Earth. "As scientists, we don't want observations to be thrown away," he says. "With the Earth, as time passes, you just get one shot at it." 
See Editorial page 369
Geoff Brumfiel is a senior reporter for Nature in London.
  • References

    1. Brumfiel, G. Nature 448, 974-975 (2007). | Article | PubMed | ISI | ChemPort |
    2. Schlesinger, W. H. & Gramenopoulos, N. Global Change Biol. 2, 137-141 (1996). | Article | ISI |
    3. Ur, J. A. Iraq 67, 317-345 (2005).
    4. Brumfiel, G. Nature 457, 1067 (2009). | Article | PubMed | ISI | ChemPort |

wer of the Pentagon: The changing face of military science

Basic research funded by the Pentagon is facing an uncertain future.
In 2005, as roadside bomb attacks were claiming ever more lives in Iraq, senior Pentagon officials called on the academic community to join a 'Manhattan Project' to counter these improvised explosive devices. By invoking the Second World War race to build the atomic bomb, military leaders seemed to be pushing for a massive investment in science that could, like the first nuclear weapon, turn the tide of war.
Academics responded with a collective shrug. The Pentagon's grand rhetoric wasn't matched with any great influx of funding for science, and it wasn't clear how any one technology could help fight a loosely organized, deliberately low-tech enemy. Besides, says Julia Erdley, deputy science adviser to the Pentagon's Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, "we are looking for near-term solutions".
Six years later, the Department of Defense (DOD) has spent more than US$17 billion on countering improvised explosive devices, but, as Erdley suggests, the vast majority of that money has gone on implementing known solutions such as stronger armour for vehicles and personnel, not advanced research. Roadside bombs remain the single biggest killer of US and allied troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pentagon officials now admit that there is no technological 'silver bullet' for preventing, detecting and disarming roadside bombs, and their Manhattan project rhetoric has long since been replaced with more sober talk of disrupting highly distributed terrorist networks (see Nature 471, 566–568; 2011).
The failure to mobilize the scientific community for the war on terror stands in stark contrast to what happened in the cold war, when Pentagon-supported science boomed, and was viewed as a crucial asset to counter Soviet technological prowess. Today's military has to operate in much more ambiguous and complex environments, in which 'soft' skills such as trust-building, intelligence-gathering and cultural insight may prove as decisive as any technological advantage. Given this new military reality, it is becoming less clear what science and technology research has to offer.

Broken programmes

That uncertainty may help to explain what some now see as a lack of sustained Pentagon support for blue-sky basic science and a preference for applied research with a short-term pay-off. "We believe that important aspects of the DoD basic research programs are 'broken' to an extent that neither throwing more money at these problems nor simple changes in procedures and definitions will fix them," wrote the JASONs, a defence advisory group made up of independent scientists, in the most recent publicly available assessment of Pentagon science and technology. (Completed in 2009, the JASON report was released to the public in May 2010.)
On the surface, the Pentagon's science base looks healthy enough, and it supports a vast array of research (see page 369). The science and technology budget, which consists of basic research, applied research and advanced technology development — budget categories 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 in Pentagon parlance — has fallen from its post-11 September 2001 peak in 2005, when it reached some $14.7 billion per year (see 'Rise and fall'). But most of that decline came in the advanced-technology category, not basic research. And the total still stands at about $12 billion a year, nearly twice the $6.8 billion budget of the US National Science Foundation, and much higher than defence science expenditures in Europe, where countries have traditionally spent only a fraction of what the United States spends on the military. In 2009, the most recent year for which figures are available, the members of European Defence Agency — every country in the European Union except Denmark — spent an aggregate of only €2.26 billion (US$3.1 billion) in the 'research and technology' category, the vast majority of which goes to the development of advanced aircraft and other weaponry, not science.
Click for larger image
Pentagon research also had a champion in former US defence secretary Robert Gates, a one-time CIA director who had been president of Texas A&M University in College Station before he came to the DOD in 2006.
For example, Gates was well aware that in many academic fields, notably the social sciences, relations with the military have been fraught and often hostile since the Vietnam War (1955–75). In 2008, hoping to rebuild those ties, Gates proposed Minerva: a basic-science programme that would specifically focus on the social sciences. Gates saw Minerva as emblematic of military science's changing mission. "The challenges facing the world require a much broader conception and application of national power than just military prowess," he said in announcing the programme. "The government and the Department of Defense need to engage additional intellectual disciplines — such as history, anthropology, sociology and evolutionary psychology."

Magnificent seven

Beginning with the president's fiscal year 2012 budget request this past February, Gates set a target of 2% annual growth in the basic-science budget over the coming years, and pledged to hold the applied- and advanced-technology accounts steady. That was particularly heartening news for those disciplines to which defence funding is crucial. About one-third of all the funding for oceanography research and computer science in the United States comes from the Pentagon, for example, as does a majority of the funding for mechanical engineering (see Nature 466, 656–657; 2010). "Physics research is no longer tied so exclusively to military funding," says David Kaiser, a historian of science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, "although it still has a large role." And the defence department is also now the largest single source of funding for research into traumatic brain injury (see page 390).
Shortly before stepping down on 30 June this year, Gates signed off a new science and technology plan for the Pentagon. The policy includes a list of priorities — which Pentagon insiders immediately dubbed the 'magnificent seven' — to be used for budget planning over the next five years.
And yet, Gates's efforts also illustrate some of the many strains in the Pentagon's science and technology programme. Minerva, in particular, has met with decidedly mixed reactions, as academics question whether the Pentagon has any business setting the course of social-science research (see Nature 455, 583–585; 2008). And the magnificent-seven list, which includes topics such as research to counter weapons of mass destruction, and engineering resilient systems, arguably hasn't done much to inspire the scientific community. "It would be hard to categorize it as bold or prescient," says Mark Lewis, an aerospace engineer at the University of Maryland in College Park and a former chief scientist of the US Air Force. It is essentially a compendium of the individual military services' wish lists. A Pentagon spokesperson also says that there are no funding goals tied to the magnificent seven.
A more fundamental issue is what many observers see as a lack of high-level vision and coordination for Pentagon research. In earlier decades, that coordination was carried out by the director for defence research and engineering (DDR&E), a position established in 1958 after the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite. Located in the Pentagon's power centre — the Office of the Secretary of Defense — this director oversaw all of the department's science and technology programmes.
But in the late 1970s, the position ceded much of its authority over budget and policy to the under secretary for acquisition — the chief weapons buyer. The DDR&E, recently renamed the assistant secretary of defence for research and engineering, was left with a limited staff, overseeing a vast portfolio of science accounts at the individual services and the Pentagon-wide Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. In recent years, the office has become marginalized, with its staff fending off spending cuts in the science budget, rather than being a driving force in military science policy.
And even when the office succeeds in defending basic research, according to the 2009 JASON report, the research inexorably gets pushed towards immediate applications. In a sample of 258 basic-research projects funded by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research in 2007, and a similar sample funded by the Army Research Office, the group found that as many as 81% "are not, even by a generous stretch, 6.1 research".
The JASONs urged the defence department to elevate and strengthen the DDR&E office, and make it independent of weapons acquisition. But the defence-department bureaucracy has given no sign that any such change is in the offing.
In the meantime, the Pentagon faces a more urgent threat. "We're starting to see a downward trend in R&D funding," says Todd Harrison, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington DC. The Obama administration has already asked the Pentagon to cut $400 billion from its budgets over the next 12 years — the current budget is about $700 billion per year — and there's no guarantee that those cuts won't be expanded as Congress struggles to trim the US federal deficit, or that the money won't come from the science and technology budget.
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Lewis sees Gates's commitment to increasing basic-science spending as one of the most important changes in the Pentagon's science policy over the past few years. The question now, however, is whether Gates's successor, former CIA director Leon Panetta, will uphold that commitment. Lewis points to the new defence secretary's confirmation hearings on Capitol Hill, when he was specifically asked that question. Panetta replied that he valued basic research — but that "all defence appropriations must be considered during this time of budget constraints".
In other words, everything is on the table for cuts, including science. "That would be a profound change," says Lewis. 
See Editorial page 369

Beyond the bomb

Nature
 
477,
 
369
 
(22 September 2011)
 
doi:10.1038/477369b
Published online
 
Twenty years after the end of the cold war scientists and the military still need each other.
With a science and technology budget that currently stands at about US$12 billion per year, the US defence complex is the world's largest investor in military research. Much of the money has gone into developing weapons of unprecedented lethality, but a large fraction supports 'dual-use' research, whose products — from the Internet to the Global Positioning System — have enriched society as a whole. And the trove of military data has proved surprisingly useful to scientists studying environmental change (see page 388).
Military efforts are also helping to improve public health. Studies of traumatic brain injuries inflicted by bomb blasts (see page 390) could aid in the diagnosis and treatment of brain injuries in civilians. And the need to keep troops healthy has resulted in advances ranging from a partially effective vaccine against HIV to a mobile-phone-based reporting system for disease cases (see page 395).
Such programmes have been strengthened by JASON, an independent panel of high-level scientists whose advice is often brutally frank (see page 397). But the Pentagon can and should do much more to support dual-use science — by, for example, minimizing the bureaucracy and secrecy that still make it far too difficult for outsiders to gain access to military data.
Defence officials should also insist that their public-health research be meticulously transparent about goals and methods — this is crucial to overcoming mistrust in the developing world. At home, the Pentagon could enhance its credibility among academics by funding discussions on the ethical, legal and social implications of its research — for example, the development of robotic warfare (see page 399).
Most fundamentally, Congress and the Pentagon should continue their strong support for military science. This is not as axiomatic as it was when the United States was in a decades-long, high-stakes technological race with the Soviet Union. Much of today's military research, in the United States and elsewhere, consists of shorter-term problem-solving, such as how to deal with low-tech roadside explosives, or the development of virtual worlds for training troops or aiding their post-injury recovery (seepage 406). As the mission becomes more diffuse, high-level support for military science may wane, especially as the Pentagon's overall funding comes under scrutiny (see page 386). Yet cutting and narrowing military research would be short-sighted, especially when the concept of national security is itself expanding, to include not just military strength, but public health, economic vigour, dealing with climate change, and all the other factors that make for a strong society.

High-fidelity projective read-out of a solid-state spin quantum register

Nature
 
(2011)
 
doi:10.1038/nature10401
Received
 
 
Accepted
 
 
Published online
 
Initialization and read-out of coupled quantum systems are essential ingredients for the implementation of quantum algorithms12. Single-shot read-out of the state of a multi-quantum-bit (multi-qubit) register would allow direct investigation of quantum correlations (entanglement), and would give access to further key resources such as quantum error correction and deterministic quantum teleportation1. Although spins in solids are attractive candidates for scalable quantum information processing, their single-shot detection has been achieved only for isolated qubits3456. Here we demonstrate the preparation and measurement of a multi-spin quantum register in a low-temperature solid-state system by implementing resonant optical excitation techniques originally developed in atomic physics. We achieve high-fidelity read-out of the electronic spin associated with a single nitrogen–vacancy centre in diamond, and use this read-out to project up to three nearby nuclear spin qubits onto a well-defined state7. Conversely, we can distinguish the state of the nuclear spins in a single shot by mapping it onto, and subsequently measuring, the electronic spin58. Finally, we show compatibility with qubit control: we demonstrate initialization, coherent manipulation and single-shot read-out in a single experiment on a two-qubit register, using techniques suitable for extension to larger registers. These results pave the way for a test of Bell’s inequalities on solid-state spins and the implementation of measurement-based quantum information protocols.

Figures at a glance

www.educasul.com.br/2010/Anais/trabalhos_educasul_educao_e_infancia/Elizângela Ribeiro de Oliveira Cabral.pdf

www.educasul.com.br/2010/Anais/trabalhos_educasul_educao_e_infancia/Elizângela Ribeiro de Oliveira Cabral.pdf